Bubnoff and Heidenhain (1881) formulated the general principle that in investigations of tlhe physiology of the nervous system every conscious process must be ruled from consideration unless it can be translated into objective terms. Pavlov (1927) adopted the same view and has consisten-tly maint,ained tlhat "there is no need for the physiologist to have recourse to psychology."
in-tegrating syst)em (Skinner, 193 1) . A large part! of the data of psvchology is based upon attempts at exactly the same sort, of analysis bf stimulus-response relationships.
The chief met,hod of physiological -_ investigation of the nervous system is therefore not+ logically prior to that of a behavioristic psychology.
The greater scientific import!ancc of the physiological studies lies rather in the simplicity of the conditions imposed and the consequent greaOer probability of a correct ,znalysis of the data. This very simplicity of the situations studied may result in a failure to consider problems which are fundamental for the behavior of the intact organism.
Psychological studies reveal many instances of behavior which seem to involve principles of integration not thus far established for the activities of the decerebrate preparat,ion and which seem out of harmony witjh concepts of neural integration derived from studies of lower centers.
Boring (1932) has stated the problem clearly.
The physiologist holds to the faith that the brain, being made up of neurons, i:: capable only of that excitation which is the sum of the excitations of many neurons, and that these central neurons obey the same laws and are excited tinder the same limitations as apply to the peripheral neurons which have been experimental.ly studied.
To this article of faith the psychologist sometimes opposes another belief, that the organization of cerebral excitation corresponds to the organization of phenomenal experience.
That t,here is any essenGa1 contlradict,ion between tlhe established facts of nerve conduction and the phenomena of complex behavior cannot, be main-tained by anyone interested in tlhe progress of nat,ural science, but the extent to which the concepts of cerebral funct,ion derived from studies of lower centers are adequat)e to a.ccount for the facts of behavior can be determined only by a more complete study of the problems of behavior and by direct experimental t)ests of the explanatory concepts.
Clinical observations and experiment al sOudies with animals provide the two principal sources of more direct data upon the act,ivities of the cerebral1 hemispheres.
The clinical facts are exceedingly complex and the possibilities of anatomical correlat.ions distlinctfly limi-ted. With animals the anatomical control may be far more perfect, but in the earlier work this advant,age was counterbalanced by the difficulties of int'erpre-ting behavior.
The past t<hirty years have seen marked development in the met(hods for st!udying animal behavior, of which little advantage has as yet been t'aken for neurological studies.
The object of t'he present review is to formulate some of t,he significant! problems on t*he borderline bet,ween psychology and neurology which may be attacked by experimental methods now available for study of animal behavior, and t,o summarize experimental data which bear most directly upon these problems.
The subject of cerebral localization has been very adequately t!reated by Hines (1929) and by Graham Brown (1927) and will be touched upon here only where it bears upon the problems of cerebral integration.
Kliiver's review of the literature on visual disturbances (1927) and Goldstein's discussions of aphasia (1923, 1924) deal with clinical aspect,s of many of t,he problems discussed here. LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES OF METHOD.
The development of techniques for the study of animal behavior since the first quantitative work of Thorndike in 1898 has opened many possibilities for correlated studies of behavior and neurology.
Methods are available for the measurement of activity (Slonaker, 1908; Szymanski, 1920; Richter, 1922 Richter, , 1927 , f or a comparison of the effectiveness of incentives (Moss, 1924; Warden, 1931) , for estimat,ion of individual differences in certain reactions termed emotional (Yerkes, 1913; Stone, 1932) , for determining sensory capacities by tlhe conditioned reflex met!hod of Pavlov (1927) and the discriminateion method of Yerkes and Watson (1911) , for measuring the rat,e of acquisition of many varieties of habits, with a number of standardized tests worked out chiefly for t,he rat and monkey, and for direct adjust,ment to many situat:ions, comparable to problems requiring reasoning and understanding of relations by man (Warner and Warden, 1927; Yerkes and Coburn, 1915; Kohler, 1921; Jacobsen, 1931; Kliiver, 1931) .
The chief difficulties in tlhe studies of behavior arise from uncertainty as to tIhe validity of the tests, a handicap shared almost equally by animal and human studies.
The development of quant,i t,ative psychological tests for various ac-tivities is bringing about a change in the fundamental conceptions of the organization of psychological traits which is t!he most significant phase of current work.
In attempts to measure individual differences, it has been a general experience that the activities or traits which were grouped together in the classical and popular cat,egories of psychology (perseverance, emotionality, intellect, and the like) often show a degree of independence which is inconsistent with the assumption that they are products of a common causal agent. Groups of activities do show a high degree of intercorrelation, indicative of a common determining factor, but these groupings are so far from coinciding with the older classification of traits that it has seemed better to investigators t.0 designate them by letters, than t,o at!tempt. to fit them into the older classification. Thus we have Intellect CM'I) (Thorndike, 1926) , traits g, c, w, etc., (SpearmaIn, 1927) instead of the familiar terms.
A test may correlate with g, which in turn correlates with ability in handling school subjects, but such ability may be independent of ability in handling mechanical problems and both independent of ability tlo make an intelligent adjustlment to social situatZions.
This means that the validity of t)he tests used must be established before their results justify any generalizations: t,hat is, the functions which they are int#ended t,o measure must be defined and it must be demonstrated that the tests actually do measure the functions. Bianchi (1922) and others who have reported intellectual defects after frontal lobe injury have stressed silly behavior, Witselsucht, which is perhaps an inadequacy of social adjustment!, whereas Feucht!wanger (1923) and otthers who report normal intelligence have used tests which probably correlat,e with the group termed g. The controversy has arisen at least, in large measure from a failure to recognize the probable diversity of t,he functions included under the popular term "intellect" and the inadequncv " of t,he tlests to measure all of t)hese functions.
In experimental studies with animals tlhe validit,y of tlhe t(ests conks still more in question, so t'hat it is scarcely safe t,o say that a test measures anything more than performance in tlhe test itself.
There is :i high correlat,ion in performance in cert#ain tests, such as t,he learning of different mazes (Stone and Nyswander, 1927; Tryon, 1931; Leeper, 1932) which justifies some generalization concerning maze-lenrning ._ ability, but even here we do not know whether we are measuring fixation. in memory (the ekphorie of Semen, 1908) , or some process akin to the solving of puzzles (insight', Kohler, 1929) .
On the physiologicaJl side, t'he methods for direct study of cerebral functlion present1 equal difliculties of another chara'&er.
We are still largely restricted to methods available to the workers of the nineteenth century.
The direct measurement of electrical changes in the cortex with the development of amplifying and recording instruments may revolutionize cerebral studies, but thus far has not given indication of differentiae which are useful for interpreting cerebral mechanisms (Travis1 and Herren, 1931; Bartley a'nd Newman, 1931) . Whether this is due to inadequacies of technique or to some fundamental. propert,y of the clortex remains to be determined, but leaves us still witah stimulation an.d extirpation methods as the chief means available for direct stludy of cortlicall funct,ion.
Stimulation of the cortex in animals permits t,he designation of some areas which seem to be more int,imately concerned with movements t#han are other areas, and in the hands of Sherrington and his co-workers has revealed something of the patterns of organization elaborated at different levels and of the mutual facilitation and inhibition of different areas. Stimulation of conscious human subjects further reveals cortical fields within which sensory elaboration occurs. The strychninization met)hod of Dusser de Barenne (1916) has given some similar data for animals. These methods, however, seem limitled to revealing rather isolated functions, and extirpation remains the principal method available for gathering data upon the r61e of the cortex in the more complex adaptive reactions of the animal to its environment. The interpretation of results obtained by the extirpation method presents peculiar difficulties. Following operations, symptoms may arise not only as a result of the simple absence of functional tissue, but also from derangement of the functions of the remaining tissue as in shock, general circulatory and nutritive changes, physical or chemical effects of necrotic or scar tissue, and the indirect depression of diaschisis. As Monakow (1914 ), Pavlov (1929 , and many others have pointed out, the immediate symptoms are an unreliable index of the functions of the area destroyed. Upon the just ascription of symptloms to these various agencies depend important points in the interpret,ation of cerebral funct,ions. Surgical shock, circulatory changes, and irritation may be controlled with considerable certainty by following changes in symptoms over a sufficiently long time, while precluding the possibility of relearning or of normal forgetting.
The control of diaschisis is more difficult since the concept is not very clearly defined.
Diaschisis and Re-education. Van Monakow's theory of diaschisis putIs serious difficulties in the way of any attempt at experimental analysis of cerebral mechanisms. Briefly, the theory embodies the following points. 1. Destruction of a cortical area may result in symptoms which are due to the withdrawal of facilitation from some other area and the resulta,nt inadequacy of functioning of that facihtated area. 2. Areas subject to such diaschisis effects recover their functions spontaneously, but no limit can be set to the time required for such recovery. 3. Only such functions as are permanently impaired can be ascribed to a destroyed area.
This theory casts doubt upon the validity of any experiment involving re-education unless it can be shown that the functions studied do not recover spontaneously but, do recover under the influence of training. Adequat'e controls of spontaneous recovery have been reported in few cases, Oden and Franz (1917) destroyed the precentral gyrus in three rhesus monkeys, left one untreated, gave the second passive massage, and the third compulsory use of the hemiplegic arm, repeating the experiment wit,h the second motor area after recovery from the effects of the first operation.
They found scarcely any spontaneous recovery, whereas compulsory use was followed by nearly complete recovery within a few weeks. Lashley (1926) varied the interval subsequent to destruction of the area striata at which retraining in the habit of reacting to light versus darkness was begun. One group, started on the seventh day after operation, had practically reacquired the habit by the fourteenth day. A second group, started on the fourteenth day, began at, the level of efficiency shown by the first group on t,he seventh day. As in the study of Oden and Franz, retraining produced recovery which did not occur spontaneously in the absence of special training.
A number of experiments, such as those of Trendelenberg (1915) , reveal recoveries ensuing promptly upon the forced use of paralyzed organs, after long periods in which no improvement was observed.
A good bit of material in human re-education indicates the same dependence of recovery upon training, but lacks rigid controls (Franz, 1905; Graham Brown and St,ewart<, 19 16) . The evidence seems conclusive that some functions lost through cerebral injury may be recovered as a result of special training and that these functions are not recovered spontaneously in the absence of -training.
Two questions at once follow this fact,: by what1 neural changes is such recovery brought1 about and what are the limits of recovery for any funct,ion?
Tfi.e mechanism of recovery through re-education. The manner in which the retraining is effective offers in each case a special problem. There seem tlo be at least three possibilities which must be t,ested: 1, Learning to get along without the lost functions. 2. Vicarious assumption of t'he functions by neural structures not previously utilized in t$he functions.
3. A reorganization within the system of which part has been dest,royed, such Chat there is compensation for the loss.
The first of t,hese possibilities is illustrated by the recovery from circus movements reported by Luciani (1907) after cerebellar unilat.eral lesions. The dogs learned tlo walk in a st,raight line by altering the postures of the fore and hind legs as might an animal with a mechanically imposed spinal curvature.
Maze running of rats with extensive cerebellar destruction (Lashley and McCarthy) in which the animals pract:ically rolled through t:he maze is a similar instance.
Bethe (1930) has reported studies of reorganization of gait following amputation of one or .I more limbs in invertebrates and in mammals. He holds that, with the removal of the limbs tlhere is an immediate reorganization of the sensorymotor system such that adequat,e walking movements, which have no counterpart in the integration of the normal animal, are made. Ill his cases, substitute activities are obvious; the problem is to determine whether they are learned, or acquired by some spontaneous central reorganization.
In studies of less objective or overt behavior it is more difficult to detect substitute activities or to rule them out as a factor in recovery of functions.
The question has been raised (Goldstein, 1931) whet.her injury to the nervous system is ever followed by a genuine restlitution of functions or whether all cases of recovery under re-education do not represent the adoption of some roundabout method of achieving the same end, such as in Bethe's studies or in the development of pseudofovea (Fuchs, 1921) . It is very difficult to obtain conclusive evidence upon the question, for the answer in any specific case depends upon opinion as to the exact nature of the defect.
Recovery from cerebral paralyses with acquisit,ion of t)he use of specific muscles seems to const,itute the best evidence for genuine restitution, but even this is not crucial, if the initial loss of use is ascribed in part to sensory defect.. Loss of habits resulting from cerebral injury and their subsequent formation at a rate and with objective performance ident!ical with their pre-operative formation argue for a restitution rather than a substitution of functions.
Formation of motor habits has been reported by Graham Brown (1916 ), Trendelenberg (1915 , and Lashley (1924a) af-ter destruction of the motor cortex. Lashley (1922) found that aft,er the complete destrucCon of the area striata#, habits based on the discriminatEion of light and darkness were abolished but could be reformed at exactily t.he same rate as the original formation in normal animals, and seemed to be performed in the same way.
The clinical literature includes many cases of recovery from amnesias with retraining (Franz, 1905 (Franz, , 1924 Head, 1926) and of improvement in other functions (Brown and Stewart, 1916) , which can be understood only in terms of some genuine rest,itution of functions.
The problem of vicarious functioning. It has generally been assumed that the recovery of functions lost after destruction of cerebral areas is due to the assumption of the functions by other cerebral areas which did not originally mediate t/he activities.
Fritsch and Hitzig (1870) first suggested this hypothesis as a possible explanation of the recovery of motor control in t!he dog after extirpation of the stimulable cortex of one hemisphere, assuming that the motor cortex of the other hemisphere assumed the lost functions. They put the hypothesis to experimental test, removing the remaining motor cortex in a second operation, and obtained the usual crossed paralysis with no recurrence of symptoms on the side of the second operation.
This negative result has been confirmed by a number of investigators both for the dog (Carville and Duret, 1875) and for primates (Trendelenberg, 1915; Oden and Franz, 1917; Leytlon and Sherrington, 1917; Lashley, 1924a) . In no case has a recurrence of the motor symptoms produced by the first lesion been reported to follow t/he destruction of the corresponding area of the opposite hemisphere.
A few t,ests have dealt with the assumption of functions by adjacent parts of the same hemisphere.
Franz (1907) reported loss of latch-box habits after destruct/ion of the frontal pole in t,he cat with relearning and a second loss following destruction of an area just back of the first lesion. He did not control these results by lesions in other parts of t.he cerebrum and recent work suggests that loss of such habit-s may follow lesions anywhere within tlhe hemispheres, so these experiments cannot, be accepted as demonstrating vicarious function of an adjacent area. All oth.er similar experiments have given negative results. Leyton and Sherrington (1917) destroyed small areas in the precentral gyrus of chimpanzees and after recovery from the local paralyses ex-tirpated surrounding regions and portions of the postcentral gyrus.
In no case did they get significant recurrence of the original paralysis. Lashley (1922) destroyed the area striata in 14 rats.
This lesion invsriablv causes loss of pre-existing habits based on the discrimination of light ani darkness.
He next trained the animals until accurate discriminat,ion of light and darkness was obtained and then destroyed one-third of the remaining cortlex in each animal, covering all parts of the cortex in difierent animals of tlhe series. Nearly perfect retention of the habit followed lesions in all parts of the remaining cortex.
No limit!ed part of t.he remaining cort!ex assumed the function of the lost striat,e area.
Arguing from the embryology of the motor cortex that the caudate nucleus might have a related function and be capable of vicarious substitution for the motor cortex, Lashley (1924a) removed the precentral gyrus in a cebus monkey and after improvement in the consequent paralysis destroyed the greater part of the caudate and the head of the lenticular nucleus.
A typical lenticular syndrome resulted but without recurrence of the hemiplegic symptoms.
In several experiments with nerve suturing, the motor nerves have been transferred from one side of the body to t#he other (Betthe, 1905; Osborne and Klivingston, 1911; Kennedy, 1913) . On later stimulation of the motor cortex, Bet,he obtained co-ordinated movementIs of all the jointIs of t!he limb although diRerent segments of the limb were innervated from different sides of the cord. In other investigations stimulation of the motor cortex after nerve crossing has given evidence only of the connection of the crossed nerves with the originally contralat)eraJ motor area. These experiments have been cit)ed as evidence for vicarious functioning, but t)h.e reorganizat,ion of co-ordinations in such cases does not necessa,rily involve anything more than such changes in function as underlie all leatrning. In fact, the experiments do not even demonstrate a change in the funcCons of the motor area, since we do not know its normal function in the movements of progression.
A reorganization of some portion of the motor system is implied but this presents a somewhat different problem from that of vicarious assumption of functions by cent'ers which have not previously been concerned in tlhe functions.
In every case where a localized area functioning vicariously has been sought!, the experiments have given only negative results.
The number and variety of such experiments is not great enough to justify a denial of the principle of vicarious functioning, but does point to the necessity for further experimenting before the use of the principle as an explanation of recovery can be accepted.
The alternative to vicarious functioning is a reorganization within EI dynamic system of which only a part has been destroyed.
Such an hypothesis has been proposed as a substitut#e for the do&rine of specific centers in spinal integration. Bethe (1931) , cit,ing his own work aOnd tlhat of Buddenbrock (1921) on spontaneous reorganization after a'mputat,ion of limbs in arthropods, assumes t,hat! co-ordination in walking is not due to specifically localized centers but is the product of relative intensities of excitation, aroused by muscle tensions, within a relatively undifferentiated system. Change in co-ordination follows spontaneously upon any change in relative masses of excit!ation within different parts of the system. Direct evidence in support of such a t!heory is lacking.
The limits of recovery. Some improvement in function seems possible aft.er any injury in the central nervous system provided adequa,te means of ret,raining are used, but the limits to improvement set by lesions of various sorts have rarely been Dested, and few generaliza-tions are possible.
There are marked interspecies differences, as in severity of paralysis (Rizeolo, 1930) so that generalizaCon from one form to another is unsafe.
In interrupt,ion of spinal tracts, the residual sensory defects seem always more severe than the mot'or, at least in forms below man, although there are always some residual motor symptoms.
With cerebral lesions, sensory defects also present the least possibility of improvement.
Scotomas from extensive lesions to the primary visual areas are permanent in many species (rat, Lashley, 1931c; dog, Minkowski, 1911) , and such improvement as a,ppears is due to substitution of function (Goldstjein, 193 1) . Defects in other less highly differentiated areas or in areas wit!h bilateral representlation of the receptors, as the somest8hetic, show a greater capacity for improvement (Foerster, 1930) . Pronounced improvement after destruction of the motor cortex is reported for all forms from the rat to man, but even in the rat there are permanent residual symptoms such as determination of the preferential use of one forepaw, after unilateral lesion (Peterson, 1931) .
For functions farther removed from the sensorimotor level the possibilities of recovery are greater.
Limits of improvement seem to be set by the extent of injury and by the complexity or psychological difficulty of the problem (Lashley, 1929a, rat; Jacobsen, 1931, monkey; von Monakow, 1914, man) . The meager data on re-education do not permit any wide generalizations.
The difficulties of interpreting tlhe results of extirpaCon experiments and the more essential contlrols of disturbing factors are illustrated by the foregoing discussion. Few investigators have attempted any systematic study of such factors and t&he great body of work upon cerebral localization is consequently inconclusive.
The conclusions drawn in the following sections must be regarded as tentative, pending further analysis of the role of diaschisis and of general circulatory and nutritive disturbances in the productlion of postoperative symptoms.
The majority of problems of cerebral function center around activities which are known tVo have been acquired through some learning process and the opinion has been expressed that the cerebrum is not essential for the performance of any unlearned or inst,incCve activity (L. Morgan, 1912) . Very few studies have dealt with the role of the cortex in instinctive behavior and the problem is greatly complicated by the difficulty of ruling out an element of learning in the acquisition of all activities (see, for example, tlhe analysis of the pecking reaction of chicks by Breed, 1911, and Bird, 1926) .
II.
Many of t,he reactions which are judged to be instinctive persist in the decorticate animal. Rogers (1922) finds that the activities of matting and rearing tlhe young by pigeons are carried out in a nea'rly normal manner after decerebration.
Shaklee (1921) reports tihat decerebration abolishes the drinking reaction of chicks but leaves pecking undisturbed.
He interprets this in terms of later phylogenetic acquisiCon of drinking.
In decerebrate mammals the range of activity is less t'han in birds.
All writers (Goltz, Rot!hmann, Zeliony, de Barenne) have reported loss of feeding reactions (taking food into the mout.1~ and passing it back to the pharynx) after decerebration, with later recovery in most animals.
Mating reactions, at lea'& in male dogs, seem to be permanent.ly abolished (Rothmann, 1923) . Instinctlive reactions other Ohan sexual have scarcely been studied in mammals.
Patterns of movement and visceral reactions corresponding to emotional behavior of the intact1 animal have been reportled in decerebrate cats (Bard, 1928) and dogs (Rothmann, 1923) . Sleep is normal except for lack of diurnal rhyt,hm (Kleit'man and Camille, 193 1).
The sex activities of the rat are the only mammalian instincts which have been subjected to careful analysis from the standpoint of origin, adequate stimulus, and other determining conditions (Stone, 1922) . Stone has found t!hat destruction of large areas of the cort'ex in the rabbit produces no dist!urbance in mating behavior (1925b).
I have observed that) nearly complete decerebration in the male rat abolishes tlhe reactions to t*he female in heat,. Lack of recognition of the adequate stimulus seems to be the primary factor in the loss, but it is also possible tfhatl the poor physical condit.ion of the animals suppresses tlhe sexual drive (Stone, 1924 (Stone, , 1925a . Unpublished observa-tions by St,one and the writer indicat'e that the more complicated activities involved in rearing the young (nest building, collecting and cleaning the young, nursing, etc.) are int'erfered with by cerebral lesions and t,hat the behavior is progressively simplified with increasing size of lesion.
The evidence seems quite conclusive t,hat such complex integrations as those involved in recognition of the female in heat and the selection of nest material develop independently of individual experience and there are indications that in mammals they cannot be performed in t,he absence of large portions of tlhe cerebral hemispheres.
This implies that some instincfs, which seem to be those requiring accurate differentiation of stimuli, are dependent upon cortical mechanisms.
Whether this dependence implies t*hat the necessary integratlions are carried out within the cortex, or only tIllat severe diaschisis of subcortical centers after decerebration persistIs indefinitely, remains uncertain.
The importance of the cerebral hemispheres for the learning process is obvious from a large number of experimentas, but little has been revealed concerning the nature of its a&vi-ties in learning. The demonstration of the formation of complex habits in arthropods (Turner, 1913; von Frisch, 1914; Schneirla, 1929) , rnolluscs (Goldsmith, 1917) , and perhaps still lower invertebrates shows that typical cerebral structures are not necessary for learning. Nor is t'here any evidence that the rate of acquisitlion of the simplest associations increases with the development of the vertebrate nervous system. On the other hand, the range of activities and the complexity of relations which can be combined in habits increases pari pa.ssu with development of the cerebral hemispheres (Lashley, 192913) . Burnett (1912) attempted to train decerebrate frogs in a simple maze which was easily learned by normal animals. His results were entirely negat>ive. His operations may have involved injury to the optic lobes. In-birds, several investigators report the acquisition of simple habits aft!er removal of tVhe cerebral hemispheres, if tlhe striate nuclei are retained. Treves and Aggazzotti (1901) trained a decerebrate pigeon t#o find itis way back to itIs perch and found that the habit was retained for several weeks without practice. Rogers (1922) observed the combination of isolated sexual reactions into the mating cycle in decerebrat'e pigeons and failed to get the integration after injury to the hypostriatum. Gemelli and Pastori (1930, 1931) trained fowls in color-discrimination and report a partial survival of the habit after decerebration witlh furt!her impr0vemen.t under practice and a subsequent, unexplained deterioration.
With decerebrate mammals the results have been for the most part negative or difficult to interpret.
Improvement with practice in a number of simple activities has been reported, but with these it is difficult to determine whether the improvement represents learning or the spontaneous recovery of reflexes. Goltz (1892) found that following operation food must be placed in the pharynx to induce swallowing but that gradually the dog came to pass food back from the jaws and ultimately to seize it when placed in contact wit,h the lips. Rothmann (1912) has reported similar observations. He also described an experiment in which the forefeet of his dog were placed on a chair and the chair drawn along the floor. At first the animal made no effort to follow.
With practice he "learned" to step with his hind feet, following the movements of the chair.
In later experiments his dogs came to leap over a hurdle, and sit up when supported against a wall (1923) . The observations of Buddenbrock (1921) and of Bethe (1930) suggest that this sort of adaptat$ion may be due to changes in postural t.onus which are not comparable to learning. These experiments, involving merely restitution of primitive functions, are of doubtful value as evidence of learning by lower centers, for, as Rothmann pointed out, the improvement may represent only the recovery of reflex mechanisms from a depression following the operation, with no involvement of associative mechanisms.
On t,he other hand, they may be instances of genuine learning.
Head and Kiddoch (1917) report an apparent conditioning of the bladder reflex in patients with complete section of the spinal cord, but the same objection applies to this evidence as to restitution of functions in decerebrate animals.
Ingebrit'sen (1932) at'tempted to est$ablish conditioned reflexes in the hind legs of rats with spinal sections.
He used animals with complete section in the thoracic region and others with two hemisections separated by about four spinal segments, attempting to associate an avoiding reaction of the foot with light contact on the thigh.
No indication of conditioning appeared in animals with complete transection. Unstable and irregular reactions appeared in animals with double hemisection, which indicated an increased exci-tability to tactile stimuli after protopat!hic stimulation. E'ew systematic att'empts to establish more complex habits in decerebrate mammals have been made. Goltz (1892) tried to train his dog to back out of a stall, but gave up training after a few unsuccessful trials. Kleitman and Camille (1931) interpret the irregular periods of activity in decerebrate dogs to a failure to form habits of diurnal activity.
In a series of papers Zeliony (1913) reported negative results in attempts to establish conditioned reflexes in decerebrate dogs, but more recently Poltyrew and Zeliony (1929, 1930) have succeeded in establishing a conditioned motor reaction to the sound of a whistle and also a differential reaction to another sound, and in two cases a further response to the lighting of an electric lamp. Necropsies of the animals have not been reported, but the descriptions of operations indicate that at most only small basal portions of -the temporal lobe remain intact.
The authors find that very strong stimuli are required to establish the conditioned reaction.
From t+he results wit,h decerebratle animals we can infer little a.s to the modifiability of subcortical mechanisms in the int~act) animal.
It may be that1 the removal of the cortex decreases the plasticity of lower centers by withdrawing some nonspecific facilitat,ion, which under normal conditions permit's learning without actually cont.ributing to the specific integrat!ions.
Such a view is supportfed by the results of Ingebrit)sen (1932) on learning after double hemisection of the cord, and by that: observations of Lashley (1926,1929a ) that the formation of some habits is closely dependent upon the mass of cortical tissue available, irrespecZive of i.ts specialized charact!er.
Crucial experiments are lacking. The reduction of automatized habits to subcortical levels. There is :t widespread belief (Morgan, 1912; Franz, 1907 ) that cont'inued practice results in tfhe formation of subcortical associative connections such that habits which originally involved the cortex are carried out wholly b3 lower centers. The belief is based by Morgan on the following argument : all cerebral activities are conscious; long-practiced habits become unconscious or automatic; therefore they are no longer execut!ed by cerebral mechanisms. The major premise is questionable or meaningless and the argument is not valid. The clinical evidence sometimes a.dvanced in support of tIhe claim that old habits survive injuries which abolish more recent ones is not conclusive because tlhe activities compared differ in many other respects than recency of acquisition. Lashlev (1921a) has attempted to test the question experimentally.
He gave ramis 1200 trials of overtraining in a simple habit of react.& to light,. With this a4mounti of training the behavior of the animals indicated aut,omatization. Removal of the striate area of the cortex resulted in a recoverable loss of tlhe habit precisely as in animals without overtraining. This is t.he only direct evidence bearing upon the question and opposes the doctrine of reduction of automatized habits to subcortical levels.
The conduction pathway in habit. On the assumption that the habit mechanism consists of definite and anatomically localized reflex pat-hways from receptor to effector, a few att,empts have been made to trace such paths through the nervous system. Lang and Olmstead (1923) established an association between an auditory stimulus and an avoiding reaction in the left hind leg in dogs. Aft,er section of the right half of the cord, the reaction did not reappear on recovery of motor control of the hind legs, but could be re-established by retraining. The authors conclude that cutting of the sensory path for pain abolishes the reaction to auditory stimulation, and speculate concerning the necessity that the entire unconditioned reflex arc remain inta,ct in order t,hat the habit: he maintained.
They did not, however, control the normal loss of such reactions through lapse of time, or allow sufficient time without retraining to eliminate a general depression from the operation as possible causes of the loss of function.
The fact that the conditional respiratory reflex persisted suggests that depression of motor centers below the lesion was an important factor in their results.
Lashley and Ball (1929) found survival of orienting contSrol of the limbs required for maze-running aft,er cervical section of the entire dorsal or of both lateral funiculi of the cord, and Ingebritsen (1932) obtlained similar accurate orientation after a double hemisection of the cord at the second and fifth cervical levels, in which no more than a small portion of the tract.s of the ventral funiculus remained uninterrupted.
Our most complete experimental data upon the afferent paths in learning and maintenance of habits are derived from studies of vision in the rat (Lashley, 1920 (Lashley, , 1922 (Lashley, , 1924b (Lashley, , 1926 (Lashley, , 1929a Freeman and Paper, 1930; Layman, 1931) . The principal findings are briefly the following :
1. The habit of entering an illuminated and avoiding a darkened alley in the Yerkes discrimination box is formed with equal rapidity by normal animals and by animals lacking the striate area, or any other part (up to at least 60 per cent) of the cerebral cortex. 2. DestructSion of the striate areas in animals previously trained produces complete amnesia which does not recover spontaneously. Dest.ruction of other parts of the cortex, even adjacent to the striate areas, does not disturb the function.
3. Animals with postoperative loss relearn the habit as rapidly as do normal animals.
4. The amount of training required is closely proportional to the amount of tissue destroyed, provided that there is some invasion of the lateral portions of both striate areas (correlation ratio equals 0.84).
5. Partial interruption of the optic radiations does not produce a proportionate loss of the habit.
6. When the habit is formed in the absence of the striate areas, subsequent destruction of any third of the remaining cortex does not seriously disturb the habit.
7. Animals trained in this habit, witIh one eye blindfolded discriminate correctly when the blindfold is t!ransferred to tlhe other eye. This transfer takes place as readily in the absence of the s-triate areas.
8. Injuries to the superior colliculi reta'rd tlhe formaCon of this habit, somewhat in proportion to the extent of injury.
9. The formation of habits based upon pattern vision is not retarded by des-truction of the colliculi.
10. Complication of tlhe habit' by requiring the discrimination of two lights approaching threshold difference results in a marked slowing of initial learning in animals lacking the area striata, although their threshold for brightness ?nay be as low as that of normal animals.
11. Destruction of tjhe St&e area's in animals previously trained in this habit results in complete amnesia. Partial destruction of the areas sometimes seems to abolish the discrimination of two light's without markedly reducing a,ccuracy in reacting t,o one light alone.
12. The degree of disturbance in learning involving tlwo light/s is somewhat proportional to the extent of dest'ruction of the area striatti, as shown by the following correlations: 13. Interruption of the optic radiations as they enter the extmwl capsule from the lat,era'l geniculate bodies perma'nently abolishes all reactions to discrete visual objects, but does not interfere with the formation of the reaction to light versus darkness.
14. Destruction of the lateral portion of both striate areas permanently abolishes all pattern discrimination.
15. Destruction of the median portions of tlhe striate area or of anv other cortical fields does not interfere with t,he formaCon of ha,bit&s based on discriminaltion of patterns.
16. Lesions in the median portion of t'he striate areas produce an amnesia, for habits based on pattern discrimination, which may be reacquired by t(raining. Lesions to other cortical fields do not, produce such an amnesia (unpublished data).
17. Animals trained on visual patterns react on the basis of the relaGve attributles of the stimuli, reacting at once to similarities when t!herct is no identit!y of retinal elementIs sCmulated.
These results embody da,ta upon both defects of vision and distlurb-* antes of memory, and, as has proved true for clinical material also, it is difficult to disentangle these two aspects of the problem. The habit based on the discrimination of light and darkness shows least dependence upon the cortex. It any striat,e area or of is formed at other portion normal rate of the cortex in the (tested absence t,o 60 per of the cent), or even after a probably complete interruption of the opt.ic radiations which abolishes all capacity to differentiate the posit,ion of objects within the visual field. This fact, taken together with t,he ret)ardation from injuries to the superior colliculi and the formation of such habits in decerebrate dogs (Poltyrew and Zeliony, 1930) , indicates that the associative mechanism for the habit lies in the subcortical structlures. When the habit is formed in normal animals injury to tlhe striate areas results in its loss, with the rat,e of relearning proportionatNe to the extent of injury.
This loss is not due to general shock, since equal injuries in ot,her parts of the cortex do not disturb the habit. It cannot1 be ascribed to localized visual defects such as scotoma, since there is no evidence that these in man necessarily involve amnesia or that the capacit.y t,o make discriminations of light and darkness is abolished in those parts of the visual field which are not included in the scotomatous area. It discrimination (as from simple luminosity), for cannot be ascribed to a change in t,he criteria of reaction to a definite visual form to reaction to under the conditions of this experiment it is practically impossible to establish a visual discrimination of pattern i&normal animals and the formation of a habit based on the simplest spatial attribute of the stimulus lights, relative size, requires from five to ten times as long training as to obtain a habit to relative brightness. The regulari-ty of effect of lesion indicated by a extent of that the correlation coefficient of 0.84 indicates various parts of the area striata have an equal function in preserving the residual traces of to the shortening of retraining the (see habit mechanism which p* 133). These results contribute have been interpreted as indicating one of two alternatives: learning of this habit in normal animals the cortex either that in the participates by t.he nonspecific f acilitat!ive effect,s upon t;he lower specific integrations between receptors and the development of some centers, and that the motor systems used in orientation are not contained in the cortex itself; or that the integrations of the habit involve a reorganization of the entire visual system without the local development of specific integrative connections.
The data upon discrimination of two lights cannot be interpreted because we have no evidence concerning the effects of interruption of the opttic radiations or of destruct,ions in the a'nterior portions of the cortex upon this function.
For pattern vision it seems clear that the discrimination of the gross visual characters of objects requires some cortical connections, but, can be mediated by the frontal portions of the cortex. This part of t,he system can mediatIe reactions to the relative position of discrete objectIs wit!hin the visual field but fails t&o distinguish between surface area and luminosity. The clear differentiation of spatial attributes of the stimulus is dependent upon the striate areas. There is no indication that any other portions of the cortex than the striate areas are conce:rned in tlhe performance of habits based on pattern discrimination. Data on postoperative amnesias for this type of habit are as yet incomplete but from results so far obtained it seems clear that the habits are dist)urbed only by lesions within the striate area and there are indications that the habits may survive the destruction of any part of the visual cortex up to at least 50 per cent in both hemispheres.
Such data are by no means adequate to solve the problem of the mut,ual relations of cortex and lower structures in learning, but they suggest that there may be both general facilitative effects and specific int.egrative relations involved. They show that the concept of simple conduction pathways from recept,or to the cortex, with the establishment there of an integrative pattern of neuron connections, is a quite inadequate picture of the afferent mechanism.
Attempts to trace the path of associative reactions within the cortex have been largely confined to the motor cortex as the most plausible point of exit. Wagner (1905 ), Bechterew (1916 ), and Gierlich (1913 have maintained that formation of motor habits is impossible after destruction of the motor cortex. Pike and Chappell (1930) have more recently reported failure in attempts to train animals (cats) in a motor habit after small injuries in one motor area. Failure in these cases may have been due to the fact that the lesions were unilateral, since Trendelenberg (1.915) and Oden and Franz (1917) have shown that recovery of ot.her. zed limb is unlikely so long as the animal has free use of the Isolation of the motor cortex from surrounding areas has given conflicting results. Marique (1885) and Exner and Paneth (1889) reported symptoms after circumsection of the area identical with those following excision. Schgfer (1901) found normal control of movement in one case, which was notI contlrolled histologically, Starlinger (1895) trained a dog to give his paw after interruption of both pyramidal tracts. Rothmann (1917) and Graham Brown (1916) report formaCon of motor habits aft,er destructlion of motor areas or pyramidal tracts. Trendelenberg (1915) taught a dog to give his right paw after total extirpation of the left cerebral hemisphere. Pa#vlov (1927) reports the establishment of condit)ioned reflexes after removal of all of the motor area*s in dogs. These autlhors, dealing with learning after extirpat*ion, have been inclined to regard t,he motor cortex as t.he chief normal source of motor impulses for habit]ual actIs and to ascribe t,heir results to vicarious functioning of efferent paths from other cortical areas.
Lashley and Franz (1917) have reported the survival of maze-running and Lashley (192lb) of visual habits after complete remova: of the motor areas in the rat,. Lashley and Ball (1929) and Ingebrit,sen (1932) report the survival of more complex maze habits after interruption of the pyramidal paths. Lashley (1924a) found that manipulative habits and habits involving visual discriminatlion survived the destruction of t.he precentral gyri in monkeys.
From these experiments he has argued t,hat) the motor areas are not normally involved in the specific integrations of habits, but are to be regarded as part of the system controlling postural reflexes. Herrick (1926) has criticized this conclusion on the grounds t,hat the experiments are not crucial, but the post,ulation of a vicarious funcConing of some other cerebral mechanism a.fter removal of the precentral gyrus leaves unexplained the immediate production of the complicated patt,erns of movement which appeared without re tlralining af t!er t, he lesions.
Lashley (1929a) has found t.ha.t the habit of t:raversing a complex maze is disturbed by injuries to a,ny part, of t,he cortex and that equal injuries in different areas have a.bout equa.1 effects.
This indicates eitIher a reduplicat,ion of specia,lized paths from lower cent{ers to and from each part1 of the c&ex, without significant1 transcortical connectlions or for some reorganizat,ion of transcortical activity which involves all parts of t'he syst'em.
Thus far tlhe attempts to trace conduction pathways involved in habits through the central nervous system have done little more than reveal t,he difficulty of obtaining evidence eit,her for or against. t,he existence of specifically differentiated conductl'on paths for learned a&ions. MostI, perhaps all, of the results can be interpreted in terms of reduplication of paths through different parts of the functional areas. On the other hand, the data are equally compatible with an interpret.a.tion which denies the existence of paOhways specifically differentiated for the habit*s through the different functional areas, and tlhis latter interpretation seems more in harmony with the facts of sensory and motor ence which will be presented in a later section (see pages 24ff.). The evidence does seem conclusive that the efferent connections of the cortex which control learned or voluntary activity descend directly from the sensory or associative areas without the intervention of the so-called motor cortex.
The mechanism of formation of associations. A survey of recent studies of the conditlions under which associations are formed shows that most of the supposed laws of learning from which the nature of t'he nervous changes involved has been inferred are seriously questioned. Practically all neurological theories of the learning process are based on the belief that th.e mere repetition of an act tends to fix it as a habit, or that the repeated occurrence together of two stimuli serves to associate them in memory. The older theories have been reviewed by Matt.haei (1921) and more recent ones by Lashley (1929b) . Starting with the importance of repetition, the theories have postulated the repeated passage of nerve impulses over conne&ing pathways and a consequent increase in conductivity in these paths brought about by cell growth, changes in intercellular connections, membranes, or the like. Recently Cason (1925) has point,ed out tlhat supposed repetition rarely if ever involves an exact or even approximatIe repetition of the same act. Peterson (1922) , Dunlap (1928) , and Thorndike (1931) on experimental grounds have denied that repetition in itself is effective in producing learning. Lashley (1929bj has stressed tihe fact that sensory and motor paths which were not activated during learning may mediate the performance of Ohe habit without additional training.
Such data seem to rule out the formation of associations by t.he repeated passage of nerve impulses over specific paths, witlh the concomitant, doctrines of local change in synaptic resistance and the like. Alternative psychological conceptions of the learning process are st#ill very vague. Goldst.ein (1906) and Kohler (1929) have stressed the import.ance of tlhe organization or Gest*altung of the material and Thorndike (1931) has formulated a similar concept of "togetherness," but so far it is possible to define the effective organization only by the fact of learning, and there seem to be clear exceptions to the rule (Kliiver, 1930). The positive inferences concerning possible neurological bases of learning which can be drawn from recent studies are still too vague to permit of any experimental evaluation (Lashley, 1929b) .
The association of diverse cytoarchitectural areas with different functions is well established, but tlhe fact has been emphasized until it obscures the really fundamental problems of cerebral physiology. The production of specific symptoms by restricted cortical lesions furnishes a valuable clue to the nature of cerebral organizat)ion but, considered alone, provides no adequate picture of t'he processes which determine integration, We cannot accept an interactionist theory which localizes psychic entities in the cortical fields and then appeals to psychological laws to explain adaptive behavior.
The facts of cerebral localization leave unanswered the question of how the specialized areas carry out their functions and of how their functions are interrelated.
Integration within specialized cortical areas. The character of organization within different cortical fields seems to differ fundamentally. The highest degree of subordinate specialization within single fields has been demonstrated for the stimulable cortex and for the visual area. Especially in primates, stimulation of the precentral gyrus reveals a great number of points whose excitation results in different co-ordinated movements of the skeletal muscles.
These have been interpreted by investigators since Fritsch and Hitxig as a mosaic of points directly and more or less exclusively connected with specific motor cells of the cord. Comparison of the position and extent of excitable areas in different animals of the same species and in the two hemispheres of the same animal (Franz, 1915; Stout, 1917; Leyton and Sherrington, 1917 ) have shown a marked variation which has no obvious counterpart in the behavior of the animals.
Lashley (1923) mapped the arm area in the right hemisphere repeatedly at intervals of 1 to 14 days.
He found that, although the excitable points remained constant in function (except for the familiar phenomena of facilitation and deviation) during any one period of exploration, there was little correspondence from day to day and the same point might elicit as primary movements entirely different patterns of activity, even movements in different segments of the body. The segmental areas (arm, leg, face) tended to retain a constant position, though with widely varying boundaries, but within each segmental area there was no consistency of primary reactions. From this he concluded that the apparent specificity of excitable points within the secondary areas (head, arm, leg) may be a matter of temporary physiological organization of the area, rather than of stable anatomical connection.
Talbert (1900) and Leyton and Sherrington (1917) also report some variability in the effects of stimulation at different times, but less than that found by Lashley.
Experimental studies of differentiation witlhin the visual cortex of animals give far less certain results than clinical studies of man, owing to our lack of any adequate means of mapping scotomas.
The older experiments of Munk (1909 ), Hitzig (1903 , and Loeb (1884) seem largely t#o have missed the projection area and to have interrupted projection fibers or induced temporary trophic disturbances.
The experiments of Minkowski (1911) on the visual cortex of the dog are the most decisive available.
He finds that the projection areas lie on the posterior and mesial surfaces of the occipital lobe, rather than at Munk's area A.
Complet,e destruction of the posterior half of the field results in permanent homonymous hemianopia in the superior quadrant, of the anterior half a like effect in the inferior quadrant.
Any lesser lesions are followed by complete recovery.
He interprets the results as showing that each retinal point is projected, not to a single point, but to an extensive area of the cortlex, so that only extensive lesions result1 in tlhe complet,e destruction of the representation of any point. Experimental studies of primates have little bearing upon the problem. >Iunk (1909), Schgfer and Brown (1888), and Panici (1903) found complete blindness only after destructions involving almost, t,he post:erior half of the cortex.
The recoveries of vision reported by these investigators and by Vitzou (1898), and Franz (1911) did not include the estimation of scotomat,ous areas and only a limited analysis of visua*l functions.
Recent anatomical studies (Poljak, 1932) indicat!e that the projection area for the macula in t!he rhesus monkey, which has been chiefly used in experimental studies, is far more extensive than ea#rlier experimenters have assumed, so that it is probable thalt considerable portions of -the macular area were uninjured in all cases where recovery was observed.
Except for t.he limited differentiation indicated by Minkowski's st,udies, experimental work with animals gives no significant evidence concerning the differentiation of function within the visual cortex. We must turn, therefore, to the clinical literature for evidence of functional differentiation within the primary visual cortex. The studies of Marie and Chatelin (1915) , Holmes and Lister (1916) , Holmes (1918) , and Sgnger (1918) establish a correspondence between retinal zones and projection fields. The fineness of this differentiation is still in disput,e and there is no clear evidence by which we can judge whether there is a dist,inct point within t.he area for each ganglion cell of the retina (Henschen, 1917), a patt,ern of overlapping zones (Minkowski, 1911) , or merely a gross polar arrangement with maximal macular effect at the pole and maximal peripheral effect at the anterior boundary of the area, as suggested by Poppelreutler (1917, pp. 68ff 4. For the somesthetic area the stimulation experiments of Graham Brown (1916) and of Leyton and Sherrington (1917) and the strychnine methods of de Barenne (1916) show differentiation in accord with the receptor surfaces, but details are not established either by the experimental or clinical literature.
In no other cortical area is there any clear evidence of a spat!ial subdivision with which elementary sensory or psychological units can be correlated.
Larionow (1898) and Eliason (Pavlov, 1927) have reported temporary loss of sensitivity to high or low tones following injuries to the auditory areas, but such results have been interpreted by Bornstein (1932) as t,he result of a general lowering of the level of functional activity and crucial experiments are lacking.
It seems unquestionably established that within some cortical areas, as defined by anatomical methods, there is a subordinate differentiation of function constituting a sort of mosaic.
It seems very probable that this mosaic differentiation is not in any case as fine as the peripheral functional units.
For other areas it seems equally certain that there is no subordinate spatial representation of functions and that any injury to the area reduces efficiency in a number of activities which :l,re independent in behavior.
It seems significant that the functions for which mosaic specialization within centers is established are just the ones which involve reaction of the organism to the spatial attributes of its environment.
The mechanism of ktegration within the spatially differentiated centers. In the cortical fields where there is a projection of sensory surfaces, how do the points or foci corresponding to the sensory units function to produce differential reactions?
Two opposing views have been advocated, the specialization of each point for a specific reaction, and the functional equivalence of the system.
Beyond the tacit assumption that the integration within centers is due to associative connections bet,ween neurons, little effort has been made to formulate and to test experimentally hypotheses concerning the functions of a cortical mosaic. Pavlov (1927) has developed a definite theory, making use of the conception of mosaic organization in explaining discrimination of tactile stimuli and of differences in pitch.
A conditioned salivary reflex was established to contact on the shoulder and conditioned inhibition to contact on the thigh.
Progressive stimulation from shoulder to thigh t,hen resulted in a gradual diminution of secretion with distance from the shoulder, an indifferent region between the points, and gradually increasing inhibitory effect as the point on the hip was approached. Point)s in front of the shoulder or on the hind foot produced reactions like but weaker than the trained points.
Pavlov interprets this as evidence that separate but adjacent inhibitory and excitatory centers are esta'blished in the cutaneous projection area of the cortex from which facilitation or inhibition irradiate so that, as the projected excitat,ion moves across the cortex with change in the locus of cutaneous exci-tat!ion, the cortical effect shifts from excitation to inhibition. The same hypothesis is applied to discrimination of pitch. The hypothesis is adequate only for the relatively simplified conditions of his experiments.
In the visual discrimination of size we may find a parallel condition.
If an animal is trained to choose a whit; circle of 6 cm. diameter and to avoid one of 4 cm., and is then confronted with a 5 cm. circle there is hesitation, vacillation, with sometimes negative, sometimes positive reactions (neutral zone, Pavlov, 1927, p. 227) . A. 2 cm. circle and a 10 cm. circle produce some uncertainty of reaction but are definitely negative and positive respectivelyThe experimental data exactly parallel those of cutaneous or of auditory discrimination.
But in this case the circles are fixated successively on -the same general regions of the retina and consequently the excitat*ion is projected to the same general areas of the cortex. Further, if the animal is confronted with a 6 cm. and a 10 cm. circle, after successive inspection, he chooses the 10 cm. and avoids the 6 cm. circle. When seen in conjunction with a larger, the previously excitatory stimulus at once becomes inhibitory.
The assumptions concerning a mosaic of inhibitory and excitatory centers is entirely inapplicable to the above data. If we assume a central inhibitory zone surrounded by a circular excitatory zone, the negative reaction to a previously positive stimulus remains unexplained e Further, in unpublished experiments I have found that the animal, t)rained to choose the largest of three circles may immediately react posit,ively to the widest lines when confronted with three fields with different widths of stripes. There is here no possibility of conformity to preexisting inhibitory or excitatory areas. From what we know of tVransposition (IGhler, 1929) in audition and discrimination of weights, the mosaic theory is equally inapplicable for these sensory fields, and if it fails here, we must be skeptical of it as applied to the special case of t a.ctile discrimination.
Theory of functional equivalence. Opposed to the mosaic theory of the functional activity of specialized fields is the concept that within the special area all parts are, in certain respects and for certain functions, equivalent. This view has been expressed by Goltz (1881) with reference to intelligence and the entire cortex, by Lashley (1929a, b) as the equipotentiality of parts, by Bethe (1931) in the theory of "sliding coupling," by Bornstein (1932) and Matthaei (1930) and seems implicit in the systems of Bianchi (1922) and of von Monakow (1914) , at, least as applied to restricted fields.
Three principal lines of evidence have been presented in favor of the theory: the functional equivalence of receptor surfaces, the spontaneous reorganization of motor reactions, and the survival of functions after desfruction of any part of nervous centers whose total destruction abolishes them.
The data upon visual discrimination of size presented above are typical of experimental analyses of the sensory determinants in behavior. I3echer (1911) The work shows t!hat, wit)hin very wide limits, the absolut:e properCes of the stimulus are relat,ively unimportant for behavior and tlhe reactions are determined by rat#ios of excitat!ion which a?re equally effect:ive when applied to a*ny group of receptor cells wit,hin the system (Lashley, 1924b) . The significance of these data for interpret.ation of integration wit,hin cortical sensorv fields has been discussed by Kohler (1929) and 1,:lshley 1930b) . " Experimental studies of spontaneous motor reorganization have been reported by Buddenbrock (1921 ), Bethe (1931 ), Lashley (1924a , Lashley and McCarthy, (1926) , Lashley and Ball (1929) . In general the results indicate that when habitually used motor organs are rendered nonfunctional by removal or paralysis, there is an immediate spont*aneous use of other motor systems which had not previously been associated with or used in the performance of the activity.
In normal human activities an unlimited number of similar instances of transfer can be cited. The shift from writing with finger movements to movement-s of the arm or even with a pencil held in the teeth still preserves the characteristics of individual chirography.
Of course there are limits to such transfer which are set by the fineness and accuracy of the movements involved, but t,he essent,ial patterns may be imposed upon the muscles of any limb.
Direct experimental evidence on the equivalence of parts of cerebral fields has been presented by Franz (1907) , Franz and Lashley (1917) , Lashley (1920 Lashley ( , 1926 Lashley ( , 1929a , Loucks (1931 ), Maier (1931 , 1932 , and clinical evidence has been given by Fuchs (1921 ), Poppelreuter (1911 , and Bijrnstein (1932) among ot,hers. The experimentlal work deals with the formaCon or postoperatlive ret*ention of specific habits after the pa.rtial destructlion of cortical fields. Franz (1907) found that motor habit!s survived the destructlion of the frontal pole of eit,her hemisphere but were abolished by destruction of both. Bianchi (1922) draiws a somewhat similar conclusion from his studies with monkeys. Lashley and Franz (1917) found loss of a latch-box habit after complet'e destruction of the frontal pole in rats, with more or less complete survival of the habit with lesser lesions.
In this work there was no adequate control of shock or diaschisis effects.
Lashley (1926) found that lesions in the a:rea striata result in a partial loss of habits based on discrjminaCon of light and darkness which is not qualitatively different for different parts of tlhe area, in experiments where shock was controlled by showing that the loss persisted for at least two weeks whereas animals could relea'rn the habit within the second week after opera.tion. Loucks (1932) found part'ial loss of the "delayed-alternat,ion habit" aftler partial destructlion of the motor and somesthetic areas which was complete only aft,er very extensive destructions.
The significant point in t,hese observations is that a limited lesion does not abolish any identifiable parts of the function, leaving others intact, but lessens efficiency in all aspects of the function.
The same type of result appears after extirpation of parts of t&e motor cortex of monkeys.
Destruction of small areas in general produces only temporary focal disturbances and large amounts must be dcstroyed in order to produce lasting defect,s (Graham Brown, 1916; Leyton and Sherrington, 1917) . These t'hree lines of evidence indicate that certiain co-ordinated actlivitiesf known to be dependent' upon definite cortlical areas, can be carried out by any part (within undefined limits) of t,he whole area. Such a condiCon might arise from tJhe presence of many duplicate reflex pat,hways through the areas and such an explanat,ion will perhaps :lccount for all1 of t.he reportled cases of survival of functions after partial destruction of their special areas, but it is inadequat)e for tlhe fact.s of sensory rand motor equivalence. These fact,s establish the principle that, once an associated react,ion has been established (e.g., a positive reaction t-o a visua'l pattern), the same reaction will be elicited by the excitat,ion of sensory cells which were never stimulated in that way during the course of t,raining.
Similarly, motor acts (e.g., opening a latch box), once acquired, may be executed immediately with motor organs which were not associat'ed with the act during training. Bet'he (1931) has generalized similar fact's under t.he principle of "sliding coupling" and, following Buddenbrock (1921) , has proposed an explanation for motor equivalence based on t#he assumptlion that! t'he excitation of a motor cent,er depends upon its tonic St&e, which in turn is determined by excit,ations aroused by the state of tension in the motor organs supplied by it. The t!heory is aIdequate for tlhe cases of direct adapt-ation of limbcoijrdination with which he deals, but seems inadequate for the adaptive reactions described by Lashley (1924b) .
Goltz (1881) first suggested a relationship between t-he ext,ent of cerebral destruction and the consequent degree of deterioration in more complex adaptive behavior. He int!erpreted the effect as due to a lowering of attention, implying that the latter is a functlion of the total energy of nervous activity available. Clinicians have occasionally emphasized the importance of the extent of cerebral involvement in product,ion of general deterioration (von Monakow, 1914; Bianchi, 1922; Head, 1926) but have not presented systematic evidence. Lashley and Franz raised the question as an experimental problem in 1917 and a number of statistical studies have since been reported. They are summarized in table 1. The use of the correlation coefficient is justified in these studies only as a crude indication of the existence of a relationship. The relationship is probably not rectilinear Lashley (1926) computied the correlation ratio for lesions in the visual cortex and obtained a value of 0.84=tO.O3 as compared with a coefficient of 0.72&0.05. From data on 127 cases Lashley and Wiley (1932) find that the retardation is best described as a logarithmic function of the extent of destruction. Beyond establishing that the retardation is disproportionatJely more severe after large than after small lesions and that the function is a cont,inuous one, the mat!hematical expression of t.he relationship has little significance.
The distribution in magnitudes of the coefficients summarized in tfhe table confirms the genuineness of the relaConship. Only three of the values available fall between 0.10 and 0.50, whereas five are approximately zero and fourteen above 0.60. This indicates that the functions fall definitelv into two types, either complet,ely independent of extent of lesion (wit,hk t,he limits of the tests) or closely dependent. It is not. The constants are for error scores where these are available, otherwise trials required for learning, or postoperative relearning. (1932) possible from the datla to formulate any generalizations concerning the activities which fall into these two classes. Apparently the simplest sensory habits and the simplest maze habits show the least relationship to cortical lesion, but the absence of correlation for initial formation of the latch-box and delayed alternation habits does not fit this int,erpretation on the sole basis of simplicity. From limited data Lashley (1929a) concluded that in maze learning the deterioration was relatively greater for mazes with many culs de sac. Lashley and Wiley have failed to confirm this, finding that the relative ease of learning simple and complex mazes is the same for normal and for operated animals. In these latter experiments only reduplication of elements in the tests was involved. Where qualitative differences in the tasks are concerned there are indications that small lesions markedly retard some functions such as are involved in the experiments of Cameron (1926 ), Maier (1932a , b), and Buytendijk (1931 , and leave others relatively undisturbed.
Jacobsen (1931) found that, after lesions to the frontal lobes in monkeys, the opening of problem boxes with several latches was greatly interfered with although each of the latches alone was opened without difficulty.
The question of what determines relative difficulty of tasks for normal animals and for animals with brain injuries is complicated by many factors. Sensory defects and motor handicaps unquestionably play a part in retarding the operated animals but in addition to this there are ot.her factors, more clearly indicated in clinical and psychological studies than in the results of physiological experiments.
Such conditions a,s the suitability of the task to the instinctive equipment of the organism, the number of elements which must be dealt with simultBaneously in integration, and previous familiarity wit/h t,hese elements, are obviously significant.
A number of cl.inical and psychological studies suggest ~1 still more fundamentlal factor which cannot as yet, be described in terms of the properties of the test situations but only in terms of effects on behavior integration. This is illustrated by the completion of simple figures in the hemianopic field (Fuchs, 1920; Poppelreuter, 1917) , by the disturbances of verbal organization in agrammatic aphasia, and in normal psychology by tlhe relative obscurity of different logical relaCons. Such variations in t'he difficulty of qualitatively different, t.asks and indications of specific organizing tendencies in nervous function suggest that the nervous mechanisms tend innately t;o cert$a<in t.ypes of integrtition and that1 t.he relative difficult,y of tasks is in large measure dependent upon the extent to which tJhey fit this pre-existing schema of organization.
The available evidence upon the relation between extent of lesion and difficulty of task is at least suggestive that furt,her investigat ions may reveal significant correlations.
The fact of a relationship between amount! of tissue destroyed and severit v of deterioraCon for cert,ain activities seems nrmly established by the data of table 1. Interpretation of the fact, still remains in question. Four possible explanations have been suggestred, and in part experiment ally tested.
1. General shock or metabolic disturbance proportional tlo t,he severity of injury.
In tests of this it has been shown that some functions which certainly involve the cort$ex (initial formation of lat,ch-box and lightdarkness discriminat,ion habits) are not affected by lesions which produce severe det,erioration in other funcCons (maze learning, "reasoning," various postoperative amnesias). The formation of habits based on light-darkness discrimination is not, retarded by destruction of the area striata although injuries in this area markedly reduce performance in Maier's experiments in peripherally blinded animals (1932b). Lesions invading the area striata without destruction of its lateral portions do not interfere with formation of habits based on discrimination of visual pat terns, but do retard maze-learning.
2. Det)erioration arises from sensory defects due to destruction of the sensory project,ion areas. To test ' this Lashley (1929a ' this Lashley ( , 1931a ) has compared FUNCTIOXS OF CEREBRAL CORTEX 31 tlhe effects on maze performance of destruction of sense organs or sensory tlracts with tlhe effects of lesions in the corresponding cortical projection areas. In all cases the deteriorateion from cortical lesions, which do not completely abolish the sensory functions, is far more severe than that following complete peripheral destlruction of sensitivity. Maier has shown that blindness reduces efficiency in his tests but t,hat in blind animals lesions in the visual cortex produce a st,ill greater loss of efficiency.
3. Reduplication of functionally equivalent conducting paths through different parts of the cortex, with deterioration proportional to the number of paths destroyed.
This explanation seems applicable to aI1 results on postoperative amnesia except those for the visual area. Lashley (1926) found that linear lesions which interrupted a large part of the optic radiations produced a disturbance only proportionatie to the amount of cortical Cssue destroyed and not tIo t'he extent of interruption of fibers.
It is difficult to see how the hypothesis of reduplicated arcs can be applied to tlhe limitations in learning capacity revealed for mazes and the "reasoning problem."
Here we should have to assume that the rate of learning is proportional to tlhe t!ot,al number of potential pathways available.
After destruction of the area striata, or of t*he posterior half of the cortex, by which the great majoritly of potential visual pat-hways have certa(inly been destroyed the formation of the habit) based upon light-darkness discrimina-tion proceeds at normal rate and must t.herefore be independent of the number of potential cortical pathways. Lashley (1929a) has presented some evidence that retentiveness for habits formed aftler cerebral injury is reduced and interprets this as meaning t&hat the capacity to retain alt'era-tions imposed by learning upon some parts of the nervous system is reduced by the absence of otlher parts, under conditions where shock or diaschisis are improbable. If t'his int,erpretaCon is correctI, it is difficult t;o harmonize wit,h the maintenance of habits by local alterations of structure.
Melton (1931) has suggested that the apparent reduction of retentiveness may have resulted from retroactive inhibition, but this interpretation does not avoid the difficulty for the theory of specific paths.
4. The deterioration is due in part to reducGon of some cerebral a&iv-it,y which is not related to specific sensory or motor functions, but is essent'ially Zihe same for all parts of t*he cortex. Lashley (1929a) has shown that the loss of Ohe maze habit aft.er dest,rucCon of the visual cortex is not dependent upon the sensory function of this area, since the loss is tlhe same in animals which were blinded by enucleation of the eyes before training in the maze. He also presented some evidence that with lesions restricted to any single cortical area the retardation in maze learning is proportional to tlhc amount of destruction within that area, and that when equal amounts of destruction within different areas are compared, the degree of retardation is equa!l. Maier (1932a, b) obtained similar results in comparison of the frontal and occipital regions for a different activity.
The data of Lashley and Wiley (1932) are less consistent on tlhis point, but support it at least for certain areas.
These facts imply that! the acCvities of any part of the cortex in the acquisitlion, retention, and performance of more complex integrative functions are conditioned by tlhe activities of all other parts. How t!his influence is exerted and what it,s relation to the specific integrative functions of the different areas may be, remains obscure.
NOW-SPECIFIC FACILITATIOPJ IN CEREBRAL ACTIVITY.
Mu& (1909) first reported the loss of motility in a limb af-ter section of its dorsal roots with temporary recovery of use during exci-tement or with rest,raint# of t'he normal contralateral limb. This type of evidence points to some general facilitative effect of t$he afferen-t impulses from the limb, as well as specific reflex integrations. There is a considerable amount ..i of unsystemat,ic evidence that this principle of nonspecific facilitation plays an important part in all nervous activity.
The postural system of the cord and medulla, the cerebellum, and the striate comples are generally regarded as not par%icipating directly in the specific integrations of learned activities, but as providing a background of posture and tom-s upon which t/he specific influences of the associative mechanisms are superimposed (Wilson, 1913; Hunt, 1920) .
The condition of animals in cerebral paralysis suggests a similar function of the motor areas. Pet#erson (1931) found that a small injury in the motor area of the forefoot normally used in feeding usually resulted in a shift to the use of tlhe other foot. Injury to t.hc motor ttrea of that foot then resulted in a return to the preferential1 use of the first. The prompt use of the paralyzed limb in monkeys after amputlation of the sound one (Trendelenberg, 1915) a#nd the partial recovery under emotional excitement noted by Minkowski (1917) and TE'lmnz suggest that t,he paralysis is in part due to inadequat,e facilit*at.ion of lower motor centers.
It is uncertain what part such nonspecific facilitative effects may play in cerebral activity.
Several lines of evidence suggest fluctuations in some general dynamic condition as important, in the production of symp-toms.
Franz has pointed out that the cerebral paralyses in man consist, in an enormous difficulty rather than an impossibility of makhg movements.
In tlhe milder amnesic forms of aphasia also there is difCcult,y in recalling rat!her than impossibility of recalling verbal material and Head (1926) has noted some of t)he ways in which t,he speech me&a-nism may be facilitated.
A parallel problem appears in the relearning time for habits lost after cerebral lesions.
On t'he first day or t,wo of retraining in light-darkness discrimination the animal with injury to t,he st'riate areas makes a purely chance score, irrespective of whet$her the injury is large or small, or whether the tests follow soon or later after the operaGon.
But with continued training a difference appears.
After ten to t,wenty trials the animal with small lesion begins to make better than chance scores and the proportlion of right reactions increases rapidly.
The animal witlh larger lesions continues for a longer time to make chance scores and increases the percentage of right responses more slowly t.han the other. This corresponds closely t'o the results of Ebbinghaus (1913) and later psychologists on t;he strength of tlhe memory trace. 1n this work it was found that1 a certain minimal number of repetitions of verbal material are necessary to obt,ain a correct, recall. After a lapse of time recall is impossible but fewer repetitions are necessary to reinstate it. If more repetit!ions are given t)han necessary t80 get recall in the first leczrning period, fewer will be required for relearning.
The longer the int.ervening time, the more repetitions are necessary to obtain a correct, reproduction.
This led to the concept of varying strength of associative connectVions and to tlhe theory that a residual associatlion may exist, which is too weak to cause reproduct.ion, but which is effe&ive in reducing the amount, of retraining necessary for reproduction. These facts suggest that associations may exist) at different energy levels and t,his seems best expressed in terms of mutual facilitation of the associative mechanisms within the t!otal syst$em of integrations constituting tlhe engram.
The assumpGon of general dynamic action of the cerebral cortex is common in neurological literature.
Upon it depend theories of the release of lower centers from inhibition in explanations of contracture, of hyperest,hesias, increased emotional excitability and the like, as well as such general concepts as "vigilance" (Head, 1923) , "affective regulaCon" (Pieron, 1923) , and the conception of "dominance" of Orton (1925) . The need for critical investigation in this field is obvious. 
